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What is minimal intelligence? Generally speaking, our understanding of intelligence has to do with
sets of biological functions of organisms that exhibit a degree of flexibility against contingencies in
their environment-induced behavioral repertoire. In principle, sensory perception, sensory-motor
coordination, basic forms of learning and memory, decision-making and problem solving, are all
marks of minimal intelligence subject to scrutiny with the toolkit of the cognitive sciences. The
bottom line is that an appraisal of the behavioral repertoire of eukaryotes, and of the organizational
features that sustain it, resists an interpretation in reactive, non-cognitive, terms.
Despite the manifest diversity in the behavior of animals, plants, fungi and protists, and the
functional specialization of different eukaryote cells, cellular organization based on the division
into a nucleus and a cytoplasm allows for the genomic collaboration in the overall guidance
of the response patterns to be observed, for example, in growth and development. However,
understanding the expression of overt behavior at the level of its eukaryote cellular basis, or
unearthing connections between behavior and genes, are but one piece of the puzzle. The research
program requires, not only that we assess the cellular changes to be associated with, say, behavioral
flexibility, but also the direct comparison across organisms with an eye to highlighting similarities
and differences in the behavior of eukaryotes. The objective is ultimately to obtain a general
picture of the capacity of organisms to solve problems in novel, often stressful, situations that
enable them to deal with variable and complex environmental circumstances. By anchoring and
comparingminimal, and yet robust, forms of behavior both functionally and structurally, the ability
of organisms to learn from previous experiences, to predict future stresses, and to shape as well as
to select suitable environments will be better appraised.
The fact that eukaryotes effectively exhibit minimal forms of intelligence might not be
breaking news. In effect, the list of minimally intelligent organisms may well include E.coli
and other prokaryotes (Lyon, 2007; Richardson, 2012, 2013). Possible examples of bacterial
intelligence include communication, decision-making, cooperative behavior, and social intelligence
as important survival strategies (Ben-Jacob et al., 2004; Hellingwerf, 2005; Lyon, 2007; Shapiro,
2007; Ben-Jacob, 2014). Coordination is needed, and cellular electrical excitability for the purpose
of the transmission of information relies upon the capacity of organisms to conduct signals from
receptor to effector sites. As a matter of fact, so-called neuroid conduction (“the propagation
of electrical events in of non-nervous, nonmuscular cells,” see Mackie, 1970, p. 319) takes place
in protists and plants. Animal nervous systems do organize signaling systems, ion channels, or
synapses in more complex forms, but the basic components are already present in precursor
organisms (see Calvo, forthcoming, and references therein).
Although minimal intelligence is likely to be present already in Eubacteria and Archaea (Crespi,
2001; Shapiro, 2007; Baluska and Mancuso, 2009), for present purposes we exclusively consider
discussion of minimal intelligence within Eukarya. This includes both unicellular and multicellular
organisms. These organisms have simple nervous systems or lack a nervous system altogether
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(Jennings, 1923). In order to maintain a sharp focus on minimal
forms of intelligence, we exclude chordates (e.g., mammals, fish,
reptiles, and birds).
How does research on minimal intelligence contribute to
cognitive science? Our attempt is to:
(i) Parcel out a set of conditions for minimal intelligence across
living systems;
(ii) Understand what sort of behavioral and biological
properties and capacities warrant the ascription of a form
of minimal intelligence to eukaryotes; and
(iii) Build-up the concept of minimal intelligence from simpler
to more complex life forms.
Our strategy is orthogonal to other attempts found in the
literature. Attempts inspired by “dual-process” theories (Evans
and Frankish, 2009), for instance, assume that intelligence in
general is implemented by two markedly different processing
subsystems. One older subsystem (evolutionary speaking) puts
us in close relation to our fellow non-human animals, and
allows for basic tasks such as pattern-recognition. Another
more recent subsystem would subserve abstract reasoning
and other competencies of that ilk (Stanovich and West,
2000). Approaches of this sort mark a divide between
minimal forms of intelligence, those that are implemented
by a more primitive subsystem, and those of full blown
intelligence that are implemented by a more recently evolved
subsystem.
Our objective is to understand how much can be revealed
about higher-level cognition before a dual-processing dichotomy
needs to be called for in the first place. This does not imply that
intelligence, writ large, may end up requiring a divide-and-rule
strategy. That is an open question. We aim to assess howmuch of
intelligent behavior can be accounted for by positing overarching
sets of mechanisms which can be generally ascribed as cognition
scales up. Our rationale is that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
we do not understand “scaling up” itself as a problem (Calvo and
Gomila, 2008). Rather we consider it as an opportunity to unearth
underlying general principles; that in this way we can bring to
light the shared building blocks that allow for the emergence
of minimal and yet robust forms of intelligence across living
systems.
By considering a diverse set of eukaryotes, stronger
interferences can be drawn about minimal forms of sensory and
perceptual capacities; simple forms of learning (associative and
non-associative); varieties of memory; goal-oriented behavior;
controlled movement; communication; decision-making;
attention; problem solving; survival circuits linked to emotion;
and related properties and capacities as realized by different
organisms. This is true not only for Drosophila, C. elegans,
Aplysia, Arabidopsis, and other models of choice with stars on
the Biology Walk of Fame (Lihoreau et al., 2012), but also for
organisms less studied and more simple (Moroz, 2009, 2014,
2015; Adamatzky, 2012, 2015; Reid et al., 2012; Kunita et al.,
2014; Pagán, 2014). Also these organisms show minimal forms
of intelligence based on shared physiology and behavioral
traits across eukaryotic living systems (Jennings, 1923; LeDoux,
2012).
One nice example of this is the light-induced escape behavior
shared between such diverse organisms as Drosophila larvae,
nematode C. elegans as well as roots of Arabidopsis and maize
(Ward et al., 2008; Xiang et al., 2010; Yokawa et al., 2011,
2013, 2014; Burbach et al., 2012; Bhatla and Horvitz, 2015).
Feeding behavior of C. elegans, for instance, appears to be
inhibited by hydrogen peroxide produced immediately after
illumination (Bhatla and Horvitz, 2015). Similarly, roots of
Arabidopsis produce hydrogen peroxide within few seconds
after their exposure to light (Yokawa et al., 2011). Illumination
stress induces effective light escape tropism in roots (Burbach
et al., 2012; Yokawa et al., 2013, 2014). Similar light escape
behavior is known to take place also in Drosophila larvae
(Keene and Sprecher, 2012; Kane et al., 2013). It is intriguing
that evolutionarily very distant organisms living underground
in darkness use the same signaling molecule, reactive oxygen
species, to change their behavior under illumination.
In the particular case of plants, we believe that unveiling why
their behavior is so flexible may cast a new light on intelligence
in general (Trewavas, 2005, 2009, 2014, 2015). Consider plant
anticipatory behavior (Novoplansky, 2009; Shemesh et al., 2010).
Our underlying working hypothesis is that adaptive plant
behavior can only take place by way of a mechanism that predicts
sensory states. The notion of anticipation, however, may come
in a variety of forms (Calvo, submitted). Whereas according
to weaker readings, anticipatory behavior may rely upon the
capacity of the system to model internally environmental sources
of stimulation, stronger forms of anticipation that explain
away internal modeling cannot be discarded beforehand (Stepp
and Turvey, 2010). We may consider “predictive coding” and
“strong anticipation” as working hypotheses subject to empirical
scrutiny. According to “predictive coding” (Friston, 2012),
behavior is to be explained pro-actively. Under a predictive
coding reading, a process of probabilistic inference allows
animals to scan their surroundings (Kok et al., 2013), estimating
the likelihood that some particular state of affairs is the source
of stimulation. “Strong anticipation,” by contrast, maintains that
predictive success does not involve modeling the future at any
stage, but is rather a function of actual past behavior (Stepp
and Turvey, 2010; Stepp et al., 2011). In the case of plants,
understanding of anticipation in terms of predictive processing
calls for studies of how plants model the environmental sources
of stimulation. Behavior of plants may thus be equally interpreted
pro-actively: plants may be able to estimate the likelihood that
one particular state of affairs, and not another, is the cause of
its sensory states. A comparative analysis with respect to other
eukaryotic life forms is also equally welcome.
Plants’ directional (tropisms) and non-directional (nastic)
responses also probably provide a salient example. The
number of growth and movement responses is highest in
roots which show gravitropism, phototropism, thigmotropism,
chemotropism, oxytropism, halotropism, electrotropism as well
as stress avoidance and escape tropisms (Gilroy, 2008; Baluska
et al., 2009; Baluška and Mancuso, 2013). Plants live in
complex environments and their survival is dependent on reliably
sampling critical parameters from their environment using their
abundant plant-specific sensory systems, and with sensitivity to
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particular environmental contexts (Trewavas, 2005, 2009, 2014).
In fact, plants and their roots sample more than 20 different
parameters from their environment and integrate this complex
sensory information online in order to mount appropriate
behavioral responses (Knight et al., 1998; Baluska et al., 2009;
Hodge, 2009; Trewavas, 2009; Karban and Shiojiri, 2010; Baluška
and Mancuso, 2013; Karban et al., 2014; Karban, 2015). It is
nonetheless not clear in what sense examples such as these
illustrate minimal intelligence. To do so, we must discard the
hypothesis that the reaction of plants, animals, fungi or protists
to environmental inputs is fully accounted for in terms of hard-
wired instincts.
Whether anticipation, as observed under tropistic, nastic
or any other overt behavioral response in plants, is accounted
for in model-based terms or not may have consequences for
the way we understand anticipation in “higher” systems.
Both empirical and theoretical research approaches on
minimal intelligence are needed. It is our conviction that
the study of simple forms of behavior from an integral
cognitive science perspective, identifying the conditions for
minimal intelligence across eukaryote, will allow us to have
a more comprehensive picture of what cognition ultimately
consists of.
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